3. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS IRAN: FROM REAGAN TO CLINTON (1980-2000)

 Author: Alvaro Montenegro P.


After the 1979 Islamic revolution that ended with the "Shah" Mohammed Reza Palavi (1941-79) in power, the United States had to reevaluate its foreign policy towards Tehran. The previous “Twin Pillars” doctrine; where Iran along with Saudi Arabia represented Washington's interests in the region (ensuring the free flow of oil, safeguarding the security of the Gulf monarchies and limiting Soviet influence) , became obsolete [1].

The new anti-American government of the “Ayatollah” Ruollah Khomeini needed to be countered. In this sense, the United States decided to support the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein (1979-2003) under a very British logic of balance of powers. In the words of Martin Indyk; Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (1993-2001) and former United States Ambassador to Israel (2013-14):

“Past administrations had chosen to back either one or the other of the larger regional powers to try to promote and protect our interest there. First, we backed Iran under the Shah, and the wen the Shahmwas overthrown in the revolution; we backed Saddam Hussein´s in Irak” [2].

Iran and Iraq would enter an eight-year war (1980-88) that ended without a clear winner. During this conflict, the government of Ronald Reagan (1981-89), with Martin Indyk as Undersecretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, contradictorily facilitated the sale of arms to the government of Ayatollah Khomeini (the United States had imposed an embargo since the 1979 revolution). arms to Iran) in what is known as the “Iran-Contra Affair” (or “Irangate”).

Ruhollah Khomeini

During the George H.W. Bush (1989-93) administration it was clear that the international context had fundamentally changed and the US foreign policy of balancing Iran with Iraq was no longer applicable. Aside from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union, there were other reasons to end the balance of power policy[3].:

• After the eight-year Iran-Iraq war both countries were militarily weakened (especially Iraq)

• As a consequence of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait) were more likely to sign military agreements with the United States, allowing Washington deploy a military presence in the region.

• The United States enjoyed good relations with the major powers in the Middle East: Egypt, Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.

According to Mraz (1996): “President Bush (senior) left with the United States unable to achieve a balance of power between Iran and a belligerent Iraq weakened by war (…) The balance of power would now depend on the Gulf Cooperation Council” [4]. (p: 25).

It was during Bill Clinton (1993-2001) that a new strategy towards Iran was adopted, leaving behind the previous “Twin Pillars” and “Balance of Powers” policies. The new doctrine, named by Martin Indyk as the “Dual Containment Policy” was intended to prevent Iran from having the same power as Iraq before the eight-year war.

For that, it was necessary to prevent any economic aid from the West from reaching Tehran - money that would be used for terrorist activities - and to block the transfer of technology that would allow the development of nuclear weapons.

Martin Indyk
However, unlike Saddam's Iraq, Washington did not have enough international support to back those unilateral policies, so an international consensus was needed. In this sense, Martin Indyk, in a 1994 symposium sponsored by the Office of Middle East Policy, established five areas in which Iran challenged not only the interests of the United States but of the international community [5]: 

1) The search for nuclear weapons and conventional. 2) Sponsorship of terrorism.
3) Opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process.
4) Threat to the Gulf monarchies.
5) Human rights violations against its own citizens, especially women and minorities religious.

Tehran Capital de Iran

REFERENCES:

[1] Lake, Anthony. (1994). Confronting Backlash States (p: 47)

[2] Indyk, M; Fuller, G; Cordesman, Anthony. (1994). Symposium on dual containment: U.S. policy towards Iran and Iraq (p:2)

[3] Lake, Anthony. (1994) (p:48-49)

[4] Mraz, Jerry. (1996). Dual containment in the Persian Gulf: strategic consideration and policy options.

[5] Indyk, M; Fuller, G; Cordesman, Anthony. (1994) (p:5)


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